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Newsletter #3 서울 횟집 수족관물
5%, 대장균 과다검출 서울 횟집 수족관물 5%, 대장균 과다검출 82개소
중 4곳 적발, 영업정지 통보 시 관계자는 “여름철 기온이 상승하면서 집단
식중독 발생이 우려되는 시기로 집단급식소, 활어횟집 등 위생 취약업소를 대상으로 지속적인 점검을 실시토록 자치구에 지침을
시달할 계획”이라며 “여름철 식중독 예방 3대 요령인 ‘손 씻기, 익혀 먹기, 끓여 먹기’를 준수해 줄 것”을 당부했 식약청, 4대
유통 협회와 유통 식품 안전 관리 업무협약 체결 식품의약품안전청은 6. 26(금) 정부중앙청사에서
주요 유통협회와 ‘유통식품 안전관리를 위한 업 [식품] 식약청,
캔디·과자류 등 유해물질 기준 강화 식약청에 따르면 팝콘 등 옥수수 함유량이 50% 이상되는 과자류에 푸모니신(인체발암추정물질) 기준을 1ppm이하로 신설했고, 메주 및 고춧가루에 대해서도 오크라톡신A(인체발암추정물질) 기준을 20ppb, 7ppb로 마련하는 등 곰팡이독소 기준을 강화했다. 또 소나 돼지의 성장촉진을 목적으로 사용이 허가된 락토파민과 초산멜렌게스트롤등 동물용의약품의 식품 중 잔류허용기준을 마련했으며, 당근, 마늘, 부추 등 3종 농산물에 대한 납 및 카드뮴 기준을 신설해 안심하고 농산물을 섭취할 수 있도록 했다. 아울러 껌, 캔디류, 음료 등에 색을 좋게 하기 위해 사용하는 클로로필, 포도과피추출색소 등 식품첨가물 30품목의 성분규격에 납, 카드뮴, 수은 등 유해중금속, 살모넬라 등 식중독균, 이소프로필알콜 등 잔류용매 등 유해물질에 대한 관리기준을 신설하기로 했다. 식약청은 식품 등의 안전기준을 강화하기 위하여
유럽연합 등 선진국의 기준·규격을 비교 검토하 용인 한 고교서
31명 집단 식중독 증세 열차 판매 도시락·김밥
식중독균 검출 해외
식품안전 위생 정보 Nestle
Unit Denied FDA Requests By JANE ZHANG Nestle USA, a unit of Switzerland-based
Nestle SA, suspended cookie-dough production at the plant June 18, but
has continued to make pasta and sauce there, Ms. Burge said. The company
has recalled 300,000 cases of refrigerated cookie-dough products. The reports, released by
the FDA in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by The Wall
Street Journal, come as FDA investigators comb the Danville plant for
clues to the E. coli outbreak in 29 states that sickened at least 69
people, including 34 who ended up in the hospital. Most of those sickened
were teenage or preteen girls, and no deaths have been reported.
Dirty stainless steel equipment
and utensils were observed in a bin which was identified as "clean"
in the cookie dough cleaning area. This is troublingly reminiscent
of the Peanut Corporation of America, which also refused to give access
to important records, forcing the FDA to invoke the Bioterrorism Act
of 2002. William Marler Opinion - Who Poisoned Our Cookies With E. coli? Source of Article: http://www.foodpoisonjournal.com/ What if the cookie dough
E. coli outbreak actually happened this way? In the next 15 minutes, every network news operation is playing the video. The broadcast networks break into regular programming to air it, and the cable news stations go nonstop with the video while talking heads dissect it. Michael Jackson fades into the distance. Coming on a Friday evening
on the East Coast, the food terrorism story catches the mainstream Media
completely off guard. Other than to say the video is being analyzed
by CIA experts, and is presumed to be authentic, there isn’t much coming
out of the government. Tell that to Stanford University
researchers who modeled a nightmare scenario where a mere 4 grams of
botulinum toxin dropped into a milk production facility could cause
serious illness and even death to 400,000 people in the United States. - Biological and chemical
agents After 9/11, Secretary Thompson said more inspectors and more traceability are keys to our food defense and safety. To date, we’ve made little movement to ensure this. Would the fact of terrorists operating from inside a manufacturing facility somewhere inside the United States bring more or effective resources to the search for the source of the E. coli? If credit-taking terrorists were putting poison on our cookies, could we be certain Uncle Sam’s response would have been more robust or effective then if it was just a “regular” food illness outbreak? Absolutely not! The CDC publicly
admits that it manages to count and track only one of every forty foodborne
illness victims, and that its inspectors miss key evidence as outbreaks
begin. The FDA is on record as referring to themselves as overburdened,
underfunded, understaffed, and in possession of no real power to make
a difference during recalls, because even Class 1 recalls are “voluntary.”
If you are a food manufacturer, packer, or distributor, you are more
likely to be hit by lightening than be inspected by the FDA. You are
perfectly free to continue to sell and distribute your poisoned product,
whether it has been poisoned accidentally or intentionally.
By way of background, the FDA has jurisdiction over all domestic and imported food products, except meat, poultry, or processed egg products, which fall under the jurisdiction of the USDA. But not all food products fall neatly on one side of the jurisdiction line or the other. For example, the products that Nestle manufactured for its Buitoni-brand fell on both sides of the line, with a few falling almost on the line. Meat-flavored pasta sauce would be inspected by the FDA, while meat sauce containing 3% or more of meat would be inspected by the USDA. The ravioli stuffed with cheese would be the responsibility of the FDA, while those stuffed with pork or prosciutto would be the responsibility of the USDA. Thus, if you look at the FDA Inspection Report from September 11 and 12, 2006, you will see that the inspector takes note of fettuccini and linguine being manufactured (FDA products), and chicken tortellini being manufactured (USDA product). Only the Toll House cookie dough products feel solely within the jurisdiction of the FDA. Nonetheless, the FDA plainly took note of all products being manufactured, without, however, making mention of whether or how what was found would be communicated to the USDA. Of course, since the USDA had an inspector onsite, and the FDA showed up in the plant only every year or so, it is the USDA that presumably knew much more about the plant. Given the presence of the USDA in the plant on a daily basis, the obvious question then is what did the USDA know, and when did it know it? Another obvious question is: Could the USDA have prevented this outbreak from occurring? And, indeed, was it potentially in a better position to prevent this outbreak. (NOTE: As part of my firm’s investigation into this outbreak we are currently attempting to obtain the USDA inspection records for this plant.) For more, please click on the Continue Reading link. The ineffectiveness of the FDA and USDA in these dual jurisdiction establishments was noted years ago. According to a March 2005 report by the General Accounting Office, there are 1,451 dual jurisdiction establishments in the United States?that is, plants that product food regulated by both the USDA and the FDA. (Other agencies that can have overlapping authority include the Environmental Protection Agency and the National Marine Fisheries Services.) In analyzing how such dual jurisdiction work in practice, the GAO found that it imposes significant and unjustified burdens on the plants, failed to adequately coordinate inspection activities, and wasted large amounts of money through duplicative training programs for inspectors, and overlapping efforts that could and should be reduced. See GAO Report, www.gao.gov/new.items/d05213.pdf Indeed, the GAO specifically noted that the 2002 Bioterrorism Act granted the FDA authority to allow USDA inspectors to alone inspect the dual jurisdiction establishments, but that the FDA has never taken any action in this regard. Finally, the GAO reminded that it had for quite some time promoted the creation of a single food safety agency with jurisdiction over all food production in the United States, stating “that improvements short of reorganizing the food safety system can be made to reduce overlaps and duplication, and to leverage existing resources.” GAO Report at 7. Plainly effective coordination did not occur at the Nestle plant. The FDA personnel inspected the Nestle plant only every year or so (on 9/06, 9/05, and 7/04). The VDACS had inspected the plant on March 12, 2009, finding “no unsanitary conditions,” but noting “observed GMP deficiencies” on a state inspection report. (This is another report we are attempting to obtain.) The VDACS also inspected the plant twice in 2007, again under contract to the FDA. Whether the state of Virginia also had jurisdiction over the plant is right now unclear, but it appears to have also been inspecting the plant pursuant to its own jurisdiction. Finally, as already noted, the USDA had an inspector onsite in the plant, but presumably the inspector stayed away from the part of the plant where the cookie dough was manufactured. This presumption is based on an USDA-FSIS Directive that states: A. FSIS inspection program
personnel are not to routinely enter or inspect an area of the establishment
in which nothing that is subject to FSIS jurisdiction occurs. Inspection
program personnel are to focus inspection toward the USDA regulated
products. There may be situations where an FDA product is processed
in close proximity to or on the same line as a FSIS regulated product,
and, therefore, inspection personnel may be in the same area. In meat
and poultry establishments the inspected facility is defined in the
grant of inspection, and in egg products establishments the entire premises
includes all buildings on the property. a. take the appropriate action
with respect to FSIS regulated products as set forth in FSIS Directive
5000.1, Revision 1, Chapter I, Sanitation and Chapter IV, Enforcement
, and See FSIS Directive 5730.1, www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/rdad/FSISDirectives/5730.1.pdf The Directive also makes clear that the agencies are supposed to communicate with each other when “foods produced in a DJE are implicated in outbreaks of foodborne illness,” but so far there has been no word yet whether such communication has taken place with regard to the Nestle Toll House cookie dough outbreak. It is also unclear what FDA policy is with regard to inter-agency communications related to an outbreak like this one. In light of the foregoing, it is hard not to think of the story of the blind men and the elephant, with each inspecting only a part of the elephant, but none of them able to determine what it was they were inspecting, or reach any other conclusions. See “Blind Men and an Elephant, Wikipedia, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blind_Men_and_an_Elephant Because each blind man knew only part of the truth, none of them were able to come to agreement as to the whole truth, even after they compared notes. In thinking about our current story, the one where cookie dough made by Nestle poisoned dozens, I can’t help but think of the FDA, USDA, and VDACS as three blind men inspecting an elephant. And perhaps the moral of our story is that it is long past time to have our food plants inspected by a single person, and one who is not blind.
The House of Representatives
plans to consider the Food Safety Enhancement Act of 2009 after July
4.
Source of Article: http://www.foodpoisonjournal.com/ The President's new Food Safety Working Group is a swell idea, but the gang needs to be meeting on a weekly basis. To date, there have been two meetings, one glossy website, and no visible action. Membership in the group has also been kept a tightly guarded secret; Ag Secretary Vilsack is on board, as is HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, and Drs. Hamburg and Sharfstein of FDA...but who else is giving advice? And what does that advice entail? Worried eaters everywhere want to know: 83 percent of the respondents to the IBM survey could identify, by name, a food product that was recalled in the past two years due to contamination. 63 percent confirmed they would not buy the food until the source of contamination had been found and addressed (adios, Nestle profits, because no one has any idea how E Coli got into the cookie dough; E coli is usually a pathogen associated with cow dung). 49 percent of the respondents also said that they'd be unlikely to purchase a food product again if it was recalled due to contamination. Food safety is not only a public health issue, it's also a huge economic issue, at a time when the country can ill afford any more debilitating economic crises. As food safety issues continue to plague the American food chain, the USDA remains devoid of an under secretary to head its own division, the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), which monitors all of the nation's meat, poultry and eggs. Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack has cited conflict of interest issues with vetted candidates as the key reason FSIS remains unguided, but now there's a new campaign brewing, from Food Democracy Now! and other food activist groups, to encourage the Secretary to finally name pre-eminent food poisoning attorney Bill Marler as his meat man. Ob Fo has long been an advocate of Mr. Marler, who is a world renowned food safety specialist, thanks to a long career as both a safety activist and the most successful prosecutor of food poisoners in the history of the US. Mr. Marler has gone through the entire administration vetting process for FSIS under secretary, including visits from the FBI, and trips to Washington. Happily, he's also paid his taxes, and he's never been registered as a lobbyist for food and Ag issues...so no worries there. Secretary Vilsack has shown himself to be quite visionary in the last six months, as he's taken on the herculean task of reforming and managing the USDA, which has an almost unbelievably huge mandate. He's made all kinds of terrific appointments, and surrounded himself with experienced professionals who will help bring the USDA into the 21st century. Bill Marler would be just this kind of visionary appointment to lead FSIS. And the timing couldn't be better, because it's BBQ season after all, and the hamburgers are going to be hitting the grill in record numbers...as meat recalls continue to flood the marketplace. Marler
Clark Calls for JBS Swift and FSIS to Reveal Retail Distribution of
E. coli-Tainted Beef In the early morning hours of Sunday, June 28, the JBS Swift Beef Company expanded the earlier recall of 41,280 pounds of beef contaminated with the highly toxic pathogen E. coli O157:H7 to include an additional 380,000 pounds. The beef recalls are FSIS Class I, meaning the “use of the product will cause serious, adverse health consequences or death.” The company and The Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) have made available a list of recalled products, but so far have refused to reveal where those products were shipped, even in light of illnesses linked to the meat. “The FSIS has indicated that 24 illnesses are being investigated in connection with the recall, and 18 have been linked,” said food safety advocate and attorney William Marler. “Yet consumers have no information as to what states or countries the tainted meat was shipped to or what retail outlets or restaurants received it. JBS Swift has this information at its fingertips, FSIS should have access to it as well, and it is unconscionable that they have not made it available to the public.”
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